Paper

An insightful 1982 paper tries to answer this question.

Why hasn’t industry pushed back?

The NRC and EPA have both formulated policy on how to handle a release of radioactive material from a nuclear power plant. The NRC urges rapid evacuation. The EPA argues for shelter in place combined with deliberate relocation. Both are wrong, but the EPA’s position is far more sensible.

Many have claimed that the radioactive release at Fukushima would have been much worse had the winds not been highly favorable. This note examines this claim and finds that the reverse is true.

This piece assumes we had a fixed compensation scheme in effect at Fukushima and compares the resulting SNT and LNT numbers.

The combination of the Price Anderson Act and the American tort system guarantees US nuclear power will not contribute to the country’s wealth and health nor to avoiding global warming in any meaningful manner. Unless this changes, American nuclear power is going nowhere.

Underwriter Certification, our proposed system for regulating nuclear power, requires a firm, automatic procedure for compensating people who have been harmed by a release of radioactive material. If humanity is to enjoy the benefits of nuclear power, it is essential that this system be reasonably realistic. It must be at least qualitatively correct, reflecting the essentials of what happens when radioactive particles interact with a human. The system must be well enough defined that underwriters can reliably estimate their loss associated with a given release. This paper attempts to come up with such a system.

A hint at what’s possible.

Third in three post series on Three Mile Island Meltdown.

Second in a two post series on the Three Mile Island meltdown